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To an industry lobbyist, therole of government is to adoptprograms and regulations that
increase profits for the firms in the
industry. Steel and timber lobbyists
argue for higher taxes on imports;
lobbyists for power generators argue
for lower air quality standards; and
farm lobbyists argue for higher sup-
port prices and stronger protection
from imports. When government re-
sponds to lobbying pressure and
adopts a new program or regulation,
all firms in the industry typically
have access to the benefits. And be-
cause the benefits often are in pro-
portion to the level of production, the
largest firms obtain the greatest ben-
efit. Thus, President Bush’s import
taxes on steel benefit the largest steel
companies the most. In agriculture,
the best example of this principle is
the sugar program. The program lim-
its U.S. imports of sugar, thus costing
U.S. consumers approximately $1.4
billion per year through higher
prices. According to a recent Heritage
Foundation study, Alfonso and Jose
Fanjul, owners of Flo-Sun, Inc., in
Palm Beach, Florida, benefit by ap-
proximately $65 million per year from
producing sugar in Central Florida.
Furthermore, they obtain an addi-
tional $60 million per year because
they are given a portion of the U.S.
import quota, which allows them to
import inexpensive Dominican sugar
into the high-priced U.S. market.
That the benefits from govern-
ment intervention in agricultural
markets accrue to the largest farms
troubles many who otherwise sup-
port farm subsidies as a means of
ensuring adequate incomes for farm
families. Making sure that farm fami-
lies were not financially destitute
was arguably the original purpose of
farm programs in the 1930s. A large
proportion of the U.S. population
lived on farms and in rural areas, so
program benefits flowed much more
widely and uniformly than they do
now. But as concentration of farm-
land ownership increased over time,
so too did concern over the concen-
tration of farm program benefits.
Congress recognized this concern in
the 1970 farm bill by placing limits
on farm program payments.
The payment limitations issue
was one of the most divisive debates
of the 2002 farm bill. Computers, the
Internet, and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act allowed the Environmental
Working Group to create a web site
that revealed that most payments
went to relatively few farmers. The
resulting publicity put supporters of
farm programs on the defensive and
gave some impetus to those who ar-
gued for an overhaul of payments. The
debate highlighted strong regional dif-
ferences on the issue. Senators and
representatives from the Midwest gen-
erally supported some tightening of
limits. Those from the South generally
opposed any new restrictions because
southern crops receive relatively high
per-acre payments.
Congress passed the new farm
bill with few meaningful changes in
payment limits. But one outcome of
the debate was the appointment of a
USDA commission to study the im-
pact of payment limitations on agri-
cultural producers and related
entities. The commission report is
expected in May or June. An exami-
nation of the economics and politics
of payment limits will give some per-
spective to the outcome of the com-
mission report. A brief review of the
recent history of payment limits is a
useful place to start.
CURRENT PAYMENT LIMITATIONS
AND THEIR EFFECTS
The 1996 farm bill limited Produc-
tion Flexibility Contract payments
(commonly known as AMTA or
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“Freedom to Farm” payments), loan
deficiency payments, and marketing
loan gains. The limits were set for a
“person,” with a person being de-
fined as an individual, limited liabil-
ity partnership or company,
corporation, or association that has
a distinct and separate interest in
the land or commodity and main-
tains separate responsibilities, ac-
counts, and funds from others
involved in the operation. For a
more detailed description of pay-
ment eligibility requirements and
limitations, see the Farm Service
Agency fact sheet at http://www.
fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/
payelig01.pdf.
Payment limits were set at
$40,000 per person for AMTA pay-
ments and $75,000 per person for
the sum of loan deficiency payments
and marketing loan gains. Persons
had to be actively engaged in farm-
ing to be eligible. A husband and
wife were considered as one person
unless they requested to be consid-
ered as separate persons and met
the exception requirements. Persons
were limited to receiving payments
on three entities. On the second and
third entities, persons were limited
to a 50 percent ownership share or
less. This means that participants
could have received up to $80,000 in
AMTA payments and $150,000 in
marketing loan benefits per year. In
addition, Congress allowed unlim-
ited use of commodity certificates or
forfeiture settlements of marketing
loans so that the $150,000 limit
could be circumvented.
The seriousness with which Con-
gress viewed these payment limits is
open to question, because once they
started to actually bind, they were
loosened. During the downturn in
crop prices in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, Congress authorized
temporary changes to the payment
limitation guidelines. The limit on
marketing loan benefits was raised
to $150,000 per person for the 1999,
2000, and 2001 crop years. In combi-
nation with the three-entity rule, this
meant that participants could re-
ceive up to $300,000 in marketing
loan benefits. The limits on AMTA
payments were not changed because
AMTA payments were fixed. The ad-
ditional marketing loss assistance
payments made in these years were
not subject to AMTA limits.
The 2002 farm bill authorizes a
new countercyclical price program
and allows updating of program
bases for farm programs. Congress
adjusted the structure of payment
limitations to account for these
changes. The combined limit on loan
deficiency payments and marketing
loan gains has been returned to
$75,000 per person. Direct payments
are limited to $40,000 per person.
Countercyclical payments are limited
to $65,000 per person. The three-
entity rule remains in effect, allowing
participants to receive up to $360,000
per year from these programs. Again,
the use of commodity certificates or
forfeiture settlement of marketing
loans does not count against market-
ing loan benefit limitations.
Senator Charles Grassley intro-
duced a bill in March 2003 that would
cap direct payments at $20,000,
countercyclical payments at $30,000,
and the combination of loan defi-
ciency payments, marketing loan
gains, commodity certificates, and
forfeiture of loans at $87,500 per per-
son per year. With the three-entity
rule, total benefits would be con-
strained to $275,000 per year. If
passed, this bill—Senate Bill 667—
would greatly increase the number of
farmers affected by payment limits.
For example, for the current crop
year, only cotton, rice, and peanut
prices are low enough to trigger
countercyclical payments.
Countercyclical payments are pro-
jected to be 13.7¢ per pound for cot-
ton and $1.66 per hundredweight for
rice. Given payment yields of 605
pounds for cotton and 48.15 hundred-
weight for rice (their national aver-
ages under the 1996 farm bill),
program participants with 923 base
acres in cotton or 957 base acres in
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rice would hit the countercyclical
limit. According to the 1997 Census of
Agriculture, 10 percent of cotton
farms and 4.5 percent of rice farms
had over 1,000 acres. Under the
Grassley proposal, 426 acres of cot-
ton and 442 acres of rice would hit
the limit. Census data shows that 28.8
percent of cotton farms and 19.9 per-
cent of rice farms exceeded 500
acres. In addition, cotton and rice
producers are the main users of com-
modity certificates. Their inclusion in
the payment limitation for marketing
loans would have a large impact on
these crops. This might explain why
senators and representatives from
the South and California are so op-
posed to payment limits in general,
and to Senate Bill 667 in particular.
DO FARM PROGRAMS INCREASE
CONCENTRATION?
Advocates of stricter payment limits
typically argue that making large
payments to wealthy farmers simply
is not fair and that adding to the
wealth of large farmers enhances
their ability to get even bigger. The
fairness of the issue is a political
judgment but we can say something
about the conditions in which pay-
ment limits increase concentration
in agriculture.
The ability to expand a farm op-
eration depends on obtaining financ-
ing, which in turn depends on the
prospective returns from the expan-
sion and the current financial condi-
tion of the farm. If two farmers are
interested in a tract of land and they
have identical cost structures and
management abilities, then prospec-
tive returns from investing in the
tract of land will be identical, which
suggests that each farmer’s willing-
ness to pay for the land is identical.
But the ability to pay for the land
may depend on credit availability. A
lower cost of capital will give an ad-
vantage. In general, the cost of capital
will depend on the riskiness of the
venture. If one of the farm operations
is much larger than the other, then
the additional riskiness from expan-
sion, expressed as a percentage of
current cash flow or net worth, will
be much less. Thus, the cost of capi-
tal will be lower for the larger farmer.
And, of course, enhancements of
cash flow from government payments
will only increase this advantage. In
this sense, farm programs can in-
crease land ownership concentration.
Of course, there are other rea-
sons why large farmers may have an
advantage in bidding for land. In-
creases in farm size often decrease
per-acre costs. These economies of
scale of the large farms can translate
into greater willingness to pay for
land. Advocates of payment limits
argue that large farms should not be
able to use government subsidies to
help finance expansion. Rather, mar-
ket returns should dictate any ex-
pansion or contraction. Strict
payment limits would reduce the
willingness to pay for land if a farm
is already above the limit, thus giv-
ing an advantage to smaller farmers
in competition for land. Adoption of
lower payment caps would not nec-
essarily result in a dramatic reduc-
tion in the price of land if there were
many farmers below the payment
cap. But the extra advantage that
large farmers have in bidding on
land would disappear.
ARE PAYMENT LIMITS CONSISTENT
WITH FARM POLICY OBJECTIVES?
Most advocates of stricter payment
limits argue that farm programs
should be designed to maintain and
strengthen the financial condition of
farm families that own and/or oper-
ate small- to moderate-sized farms,
as was their original intention in the
1930s. Supporting the wealth of large
farmers does not seem consistent
with this objective. Judging Con-
gress by its actions rather than its
rhetoric, we must conclude that the
objective of the farm program has
changed. After all, Congress makes
payments when prices are low with-
out regard to production costs,
makes disaster payments when
yields are low without regard to
prices received, and makes no ac-
count of the actual financial condi-
tions of farm families before cutting
checks. That is, there is little target-
ing of payments and absolutely no
means tests. Moreover, it is well
documented that average farm fam-
ily income meets or exceeds non-
farm family income. So, without a
means test, most farm support flows
to families that have higher-than-
average incomes.
We cannot conclude, however,
that maintaining farm income is not
the objective of farm programs. As
Senator Lugar of Indiana argues, the
farm policy actions of Congress over
the last 10 to 20 years are consistent
with a policy objective of maintain-
ing national net farm income at a
particular level. Given that so few
commodities receive subsidies, per-
haps it is more accurate to say that
Congress wants to support the farm
income generated by a chosen few
commodities.
Maintaining national or aggre-
gate farm income is analogous to an
industrial policy objective, because
what matters is aggregate income in
the industry. Any payment to any
participant in the industry helps ful-
fill the objective. Maintenance of
family income, on the other hand,
requires an income means test,
much like we have with food stamps
and other social welfare programs. A
recent USDA study showed that farm
family income could be supported at
a far lower cost than that of the cur-
rent commodity programs.
Even if Congress were to decide
to target program benefits to farm
families in financial difficulty, it is
not clear that this would be best ac-
complished through stricter pay-
ment limits. The most direct tool for
achieving this policy objective is the
tax code. For example, a government
payment could be made to farm
families that do not meet a certain
income threshold.
What then can be said about ar-
guments for and against payment
continued on page 10
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2 percent to a stacked gene variety
having both insect and herbicide re-
sistance. Statewide, 41 percent of
the 2002 Iowa corn crop was geneti-
cally modified: 31 percent was Bt
corn, while 7 percent was herbicide
resistant and 3 percent was a
stacked gene variety. The 2003 inten-
tions survey shows nationwide that
corn producers intend to increase
their Bt corn plantings by 4 percent-
age points, while the shares of their
acres planted to herbicide-resistant
varieties remain unchanged, and
stacked gene varieties will increase
by only 1 percentage point. Iowa
growers intend to sow 47 percent of
their corn acreage to genetically
modified varieties. The share of in-
tended Bt corn increases to 38 per-
cent, the share of stacked gene corn
increases to 4 percent, and the share
of acreage planted to herbicide-resis-
tant corn falls to 5 percent.
Nationally, the intentions for
2003 show continued growth for her-
bicide-resistant soybeans, with 80
percent of the soybean crop allo-
cated to biotechnology varieties
compared with 75 percent last year.
Iowa soybean producers indicate
that 82 percent of the new crop will
be herbicide resistant compared to
75 percent in 2002.
LIVESTOCK
The March 28 USDA Hogs and Pigs
report indicated an expected de-
cline in hog numbers and the con-
tinuing liquidation of the breeding
herd. The inventory on U.S. farms is
lowered to 58.1 million head of
hogs, down almost 2 percent from
both a year ago and last quarter.
The breeding herd, at 5.96 million
head, is 4 percent below last year’s
level and 1 percent below the level
of the last report. The March inven-
tory of market hogs, at 52.2 million
head, is 2 percent below last year
and 3 percent below the December
inventory, which is indicative of
lower marketings this spring and
summer compared with last year.
Consistent spring and summer far-
rowing intentions reported by U.S.
hog producers are both 3 percent
below the actual farrowings at these
periods last year, suggesting that
marketings this fall and winter will
also fall considerably lower than
last year’s levels.
However, the report had little
positive impact on prices, as mar-
kets waited for further symptoms of
moderating hog slaughter in light of
the recent discrepancy between the
actual slaughter numbers and the
numbers calculated from the official
reports. Market observers specu-
late that the projected lower beef
and poultry production is likely to
help sustain the hog price rebound.
Pork stocks in cold storage con-
tinue to exceed last year’s levels
but are expected to decline in the
future. Having achieved significant
rates of growth in pork exports, the
pork industry is now more exposed
to volatile international markets,
as well as foreign meat safety regu-
lations, trade barriers, foreign
competition, and freight costs. Ac-
counting for changes in productiv-
ity, strong demand for bacon, and
new pork products, prices are ex-
pected to reach levels profitable
for producers this summer before
declining in the fall, according to
some estimates.
In Iowa, the inventory of mar-
ket hogs was estimated at 14.9 mil-
lion head, down 1.3 percent from
March 2002, a bit lower than the
nationwide level. However, the
state’s breeding herd showed a sig-
nificant drop of 7.1 percent, indicat-
ing a higher number of out-of-state
feeder pigs.
FARM INCOME
Statewide cash receipts, at $11.16
billion, fell slightly in 2002 com-
pared with last year’s receipts but
are nearly on a par with the five-
year average. While the revenues
in the crop sector rose 11 percent,
cash receipts for livestock fell 14
percent below last year’s income.
The increase in crop cash receipts
has been reflected in rising cash
rental rates for cropland. Iowa
cropland rates averaged $120 per
acre, up $3 from last year. Fiscal
year government payments for
Iowa fell from $2.302 billion in 2000
to $1.972 billion in 2001, mostly
because higher grain prices re-
duced payments under marketing
loan programs. 
Iowa’s Agricultural Situation
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limits? Opponents and proponents of
stricter payment limits will argue
endlessly about the fairness of large
payments to farmers. But this argu-
ment misses the point. Just because
large payments are made to indi-
vidual farmers does not mean that
the objectives of farm programs are
not being met. Congress has demon-
strated repeatedly that it wants to
subsidize a particular subset of U.S.
crops. And it is difficult to subsidize a
heterogeneous sector of the
economy without bestowing the larg-
est portion of subsidies on the largest
firms in the sector. Furthermore, it
could be argued that farm programs
exist precisely because they make
large payments to wealthy farmers.
That is, the potential for large subsi-
dies gives the largest farmers a rea-
son to lobby Congress to continue
farm programs.
So, what we are left with is a po-
litical decision about who gets what
portion of farm program benefits
and the purpose of the programs.
Given that current farm policy works
like an industrial policy for chosen
commodities, there is no economic
efficiency  rationale for payment lim-
its. Political and equity concerns will
decide the issue. 
Payment Limitations
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